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Abstract ‐  S o m e  o f  t h e  r o o t s  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  r e c e n t  c r i s i s  m a y  b e  f o u n d  i n  t h e  g l o b a l  
convergence  towards  a  model  characterized  by  strong  property  rights  and  an  extremely 
limited role attributed to “open science”. The modern economy has increasingly moved from 
a n  o p e n  s c i e n c e  –  o p e n  m a r k e t s  m o d e l  t o w a r d  a  c l o s e d  s c i e n c e  –  closed  markets model. 
Paradoxically, while a non‐rival resource like knowledge becomes the most relevant input, 
small firms and new entrants find it increasingly difficult to be competitive with large and 





















In the present economy we live a “property right paradox”. Its knowledge-intensive 
characteristics should favour small size firms, managed, or even owned, by the people 
working in them. By contrast, firms size as well as traditional forms of capitalist ownership 
show little sign to undergo a substantial change in contemporary knowledge-intensive 
economies. In this paper we will argue that the current crisis is somehow related to this 
“property right paradox”: the present prevailing ownership structure of knowledge 
economies inhibits investments, favours the generation of crises and limits the development 
of the world economy.  
 
 
Some roots of the recent crisis may be found in the global convergence towards a model 
characterized by strong private property rights on knowledge and an extremely limited role 
attributed to “open science”
i. Such a model prevents the shift towards the allocation of 
organizational rights to workers, i.e. towards a property rights allocation congruent with the 
intrinsic nature of what has become the most important factor of production in the 
knowledge-intensive economy, and is progressively increasing the costs of innovations and 
limiting the scope of investments in new knowledge production, with obvious 
consequences in terms of overall performance of the economy (Pagano, Rossi 2009). The 
same forces that block the changes of property rights are also inhibiting investments and 
widening the global imbalances between savings and investments, which, as we will try to 
show in this paper, are mainly due to the deficiency of the latter. 
 
 
Our main policy suggestion is that an exit from the current crisis is related to a 
transformation of property relations and to a reduction of inequality. The public sharing of 
essential knowledge has desirable inequality-decreasing consequences and makes it viable 
the existence of small (and possibly democratic) firms, which can all use simultaneously 
this non-rival good. Furthermore, moving essential knowledge from the private to the 
public sphere can contribute to re-launching the economy, creating the conditions for a 
sustained development. In a knowledge economy, it is possible to set in motion a super-
multiplier coupling the traditional expansive effects of Keynesian spending in time of crisis 
with the multiplying virtues of non-rival human knowledge: even in the short run, a buy-out 
of private (that is, monopolised) knowledge may have effects that go well beyond the 
traditional policies of public spending. On the one hand, the former monopolist, having 
received fresh money and facing more competition, is induced to increase his investments. 




We structure our paper in the following way. In the next section we consider in detail the 
nature of the “property right paradox” characterizing contemporary knowledge intensive 
economies. In the second section we argue that the paradox arises from two sets of 
alternative institutional complementarities: the first tightening together closed science and  2
closed markets and the second linking open science and open markets. We argue that the 
global economy is increasingly favouring the first set of complementarities. In turn, these 
complementarities cause growing inequalities among individuals, firms and countries and, 
at the same time, inhibit the development of the world economy. In our view, the rise as 
well as the present crash of the knowledge economy, is related to a dramatic shift in 
balance from open science and open markets to closed science and closed markets.   
In the last section, we focus on the policy suggestions stemming from our analysis which 




THE “PROPERTY RIGHT PARADOX” OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY. 
 
Physical capital-intensive economies have traditionally been characterized by capitalist 
ownership of the means of production. This prevalence of the "capital-hiring-labour" 
solution does not find an adequate explanation in the standard neoclassical theory, which a-
critically and implicitly assumes a double form of neutrality: of technologies with respect to 
property rights allocations and vice-versa. In other words, according to standard 
neoclassical thinking, the various technologies and productive forces have no influence on 
the efficiency of the various kinds of ownership arrangements and, at the same time, the 
various kinds of ownership arrangements (for example control of the firm by workers or 
capitalists) have no influence on the nature of the productive forces and on the type of 
technology used. A famous dictum by Samuelson (1957, p. 894) states this dual neutrality 
of the neoclassical theory very clearly: “In a competitive economy it really doesn’t matter 
who hires whom”.  
 
 
This two-fold neutrality crucially depends on the assumption of nil transaction costs and 
complete and perfectly enforceable contracts. When this assumption holds, non-owners do 
not face any risk of opportunistic behaviour, since contracts will protect agents' investments 
whether or not they have property rights over the means of production. Thus, a competitive 
equilibrium with complete contracts will in any case entail the efficient organization of 
production, both when the capitalist employs the workers, and when the contract provides 
for the workers to rent the means of production from the owner. The nature of the resources 




Discarding the hypothesis of nil transaction costs has profound effects on the neoclassical 
edifice. It eliminates the twofold neutrality of rights with respect to technologies, and of 
technologies with respect to rights.  The mechanisms identified by neo-institutionalists – 
Oliver Williamson (1985), for example – have cast serious doubts on the hypothesis that 
technologies are neutral in regard to the nature of property rights and allocation of control 
over firms.  
  3
 
Indeed, in presence of positive transaction costs and incomplete contracts, when inputs are 
specific (i.e. when they cannot be put to other uses without losing some of their value), 
those who invest in specific resources are made vulnerable by the possible loss of value of 
their investment due to the absence of alternative uses, and will therefore have greater 
incentives to invest if protected by the ownership of the means of production (see, e.g., Hart 
1995). The allocation of property rights to the agents that can make the most specific 
investments is more efficient than alternative property rights allocations because it allows 
to save transaction costs and it enhances investment.  
 
 
Similarly, in presence of information asymmetries, the technologies employed determine 
the distribution of information among agents.  In this case, the allocation of ownership 
rights to the agents difficult to control (and/or controllable at very high costs) is more 




In both cases, Samuelson’s proposition no longer holds, because in this situation “who hires 
whom” becomes important. In other words, the characteristics of the productive forces 
influence the attribution of control rights because the most specific and difficult to monitor 
agents can save the greatest amount of agency costs when they control the organization. 
 
 
The reasoning of radical economists
iii has undermined also the second part of the 
neoclassical neutrality assumption, contributing to understand the prevalence of the 
"capital-hiring-labour" solution in physical capital-intensive economies. Radical thinking 
can be interpreted as implying, in situations of contractual incompleteness, that those with 
control rights over a firm have relatively fewer inhibitions about developing resources 
specific to that organization and that they will tend to adopt technologies that shift 
information asymmetries in their favour. In other words, the agents to which ownership is 
attributed will tend to become the most specific and difficult to monitor. This implies that 





Summing up: while who-hires-whom does not matter in a world of zero transaction costs, it 
matters in a world of positive transaction costs. Even if technology is partially endogenous, 
one could argue that developments that go in the direction of making it convenient a high 
intensity of non-human capital should also make the capital-hiring-labour solution more 
appealing, especially when capital is specific and difficult-to-monitor (in the sense that its 
user-induced depreciation cannot be easily assessed by observing the state of a machine and 
a relevant informational asymmetry exists between users and absentee owners of 
machines). In these conditions, the labour-renting-capital solution becomes prohibitively 
costly and also other solutions (such as labour borrowing capital and buying machines) 
involve very high agency costs. Perhaps a limited multiplicity of alternative technologies is  4
available (and more could have been developed in the case of widespread labour-owned 
firms). However, one can argue that the intense use of physical capital has acted in favour 
of the capital-hiring labour solution.  
 
 
The central question here addressed is whether the intense use of knowledge in production 
should imply a radical departure from the organizational forms which have characterised 
the age of intensive use of physical capital. Two features of knowledge should, at first 
glance, imply that the advent of the knowledge economy should coincide with an 
increasing comparative advantage of labour-hiring-capital firms with respect to the capital-
hiring-labour firms. First, knowledge is often embodied in human beings and in a 
knowledge-intensive economy one should expect for this reason that the labour-hiring-
capital solutions should often be advantageous because it implies lower agency costs. 
Second, the knowledge that is not embodied in human beings can be made available to 
additional members of society without depriving the former users of its availability. Unlike 
a piece of physical capital, an idea can be used simultaneously by many people without 
being warn out (indeed, the opposite is true: the use of ideas helps the memory and the 
improvement of ideas). Since the marginal cost of using disembodied knowledge is zero, 
these firms should not face the renting and borrowing agency problems, which do usually 
upset the labour-hiring-physical-capital firms. 
 
 
However, while the trends of some sectors seem to confirm this prediction, on the whole 
modern capitalism does not seem to show a great deal of discontinuity with its recent past. 
One could "save" the predicted discontinuities by arguing that the knowledge-intensive 
economy is not yet sufficiently intensive to produce widespread institutional changes. The 
other possibility is that some important elements of the characterization of knowledge are 
missing in the above reasoning and may help to solve the property right paradox which 
characterises our economy.  
 
 
The hypothesis that the knowledge-intensive economy may involve a fundamental 
discontinuity in the organization of the economy relies on the fact that, unlike physical 
goods, knowledge is a public good in the sense that there is no cost involved by increasing 
the number of its users. However, pure public goods are a mix of two ingredients: non-
rivalry in consumption and impossibility of exclusion from consumption. While the first 
feature surely attaches to knowledge, the second does not necessarily characterize it. 
Knowledge is a public good in the sense that it is a non‐rival good but exclusion of others 
from intellectual ownership is well possible.  
 
 
Indeed, not only excludability of knowledge is possible, but it also has broader and more 
profound consequences than it is the case for physical objects. In the latter case, both the 
definition and the enforcement of private property are specified at the local level and they 
are unlikely to have any relevant implication in distant locations. The legal positions  5
defining the private ownership of knowledge have, by contrast, often a global nature.  They 
may involve restrictions for many individuals at various country locations and potentially 
for all the individuals of the world.  Intellectual property rights, such as they are currently 
defined by the TRIPs agreement and enforced by the WTO, have this nature.  Their 
ownership by some individuals involves restrictions for all the other individuals.    
 
 
This is not the end of the story, for knowledge privatization also influences the relative 
profitability of alternative property rights allocations within the firm, i.e. of the "capital-
hiring-labour" solution vis-à-vis the "labour-hiring-capital" solution. This is for at least 
three reasons. First, if agents can hold exclusive monopoly rights on knowledge, the use of 
the latter is going to be rather expensive and it is likely to increase the agency costs of 




Second, when knowledge is privatized, the size of the firm matters: each unit of proprietary 
knowledge can be used an infinite number of times, involving a dramatic form  of (firm-
level artificially restricted) increasing returns. Moreover, each additional unit of knowledge 
which is owned produces more than proportionally opportunities to exploit the 
complementarities with the other units in the never-ending production of new knowledge 
and makes it even more valuable to produce or acquire from small firms additional 
knowledge. And size matters also in another crucial respect: the greater the concentration of 
knowledge, the lower the unit cost of defending the exclusive ownership rights on each unit 
of knowledge, which each other competitor could independently discover or imitate. Here 
the  property right paradox of the modern knowledge economy becomes particularly 
evident: the non-rival nature of knowledge, which could in principle favour small and even 
self-managed firms, produces artificial economies of size and makes the acquisition and the 
defence of property rights so difficult that only big firms can effectively afford it.  
 
 
Third, knowledge privatization may inhibit investment in human capital. Absent knowledge 
privatization, the need to provide incentives to invest in human capital would be an 
argument favouring the labour-hiring-capital solution. As explained above, when markets 
are characterized by positive transaction costs and individuals are wealth-constrained, the 
owners of the means of production have greater incentives to develop their capabilities and, 
for this reason, tend to become the best owners.  This incentive effect of ownership is much 
stronger for intellectual property because the right to exclude involves a restriction of the 
liberty of all the other individuals to replicate similar means of production (Pagano and 
Rossi, 2004).  
 
 
In the case of a machine, an individual, who has learnt to work and possibly to innovate 
with skills that are partially specific to the machine, is only partially damaged if he is 
deprived of its use.  He keeps the liberty to work with other machines or to build identical  6
machines. The damage is more relevant in the case in which an individual has acquired 
skills that are specific to a piece of intellectual property and he is denied access to this 
asset.  The nature of intellectual property implies that he does not keep the liberty to work 
with or to “re-discover” a similar piece of knowledge.  IPRs involve a global right to limit 
the access of all individuals to the use of all the similar pieces of knowledge, including 
those that are independently developed.  Turning a public good like knowledge into a 
private good transforms a universal unlimited liberty into an asymmetric legal position 
limiting non-owners’ freedom well beyond the restrictions that stem from the property 
rights defined on traditional rival goods. 
 
 
For some individuals, the monopolistic ownership of intellectual property encourages 
investment in the skills necessary to improve the knowledge that one owns and the skills 
that are developed make it even more convenient to acquire and produce more private 
knowledge.  By contrast, other individuals may be trapped in vicious circles of under-
investment in human capital where the lack of intellectual property discourages the 
acquisition of skills and the lack of skills discourages the acquisition of intellectual 
property (Pagano and Rossi 2004). The interaction between the accumulation of privatized 
knowledge has self-reinforcing properties: it generates vicious and virtuous circles  of 
cumulative causation,  leading to asymmetric, and increasingly divergent, investment 
patterns in human capital. 
 
 
For these three reasons, the typologies of firms that tend to prevail in the knowledge 
economy will crucially depend on the role and the relative weights of the institutions of 
open science and the degree of private intellectual property rights protection. Greater 
knowledge privatization tilts the balance in favour of the "capital-hiring-labour" solution, in 
spite of the fact that the property of non-rivalness of knowledge and its embodied form 
would suggest the optimality of the "labour-hiring-capital" solution.  
 
 
In the contemporary knowledge economy, the role of open science appears much less 
prominent than it used to be at the time when its very seeds were developed. This is 
reflected in the tendency to protect upstream knowledge through private property rights to 
an extent unimaginable in earlier times and to reduce the extent of publicly funded open 
science.  The absence of an adequate provision of public knowledge and the over-
upstreaming of private intellectual property is a likely result of the absence of adequate 
global institutions for funding public research and the rent-seeking activities of the firms 
which seek monopoly power on their products and the technology that they use. 
 
 
The reasons for these developments will be explored in the next section. For the moment 
we limit ourselves to highlight that, in this environment characterized by an institutional 
complementarity between closed markets and closed science, the selection of firms will be 
biased in favour of the capital-hiring-labour solution and that it is very doubtful that the  7
advent of the knowledge intensive economy will involve a substantial move to the labour-
hiring-capital organizational form. The hypothesis that the intense use of non-rival 
disembodied knowledge capital would imply a substantial decrease of the agency costs in 
comparison to firms making an intensive use of physical capital holds true only if much 
knowledge is produced using the institutions of open science.  
Under the present global economic regime, this direction of causation, flowing from 
technological change towards a mutation of property rights regime,  may well be overcome 
by the opposite one. The prevailing regime of standard capitalist rights shapes the new 
knowledge technologies and consolidates its dominant position.  If much knowledge is 
privatised, the knowledge-intensive economy may turn out to be even more unfriendly than 
the physical intensive economy to stronger organizational rights for the large majority of 
the individuals. They do not enjoy the freedom of a  world of open science and open 
markets. Instead, together with the overall performance of the economy, they suffer the 
limitations of the unhealthy alliance between closed science and closed markets. 
 
 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
 
  The same sort of institutional complementarities that block the micro-level change in the 
property rights structure of firms crystallize a property rights equilibrium at the macro 
level, i.e. in the allocation of property rights among countries, again with profound impacts 
on investments. This state of affairs, in turn, tends to deepen global imbalances in the 
allocation of intellectual capital that may have enduring effects on the ability of the 
economy to recover from the crisis.  We will claim that both the rise and the current fall of 
the knowledge economy can be  by reference to the gradual emergence of a "closed 
science/closed markets" production model. Thus, an important background question to be 
asked concerns the reasons for the emergence of a global institutional framework of 
knowledge production characterized by strong property rights and an extremely limited role 
attributed to “open science”.   
 
 
The end of the Cold War implied a significant technological "shock" for the US economy, 
due to the lifting of the veil of secrecy that had for long wrapped defence-sponsored 
innovations (Visco 2009). For almost half a century, starting at the end of WWII, 
technological developments were led by the extraordinary military effort linked to the Cold 
War. New knowledge (ICT technologies, materials, mechanics) developed to contrast 
Soviet power, was held secret and the extent to which it was put to use in civilian activities 
was rather limited. With the end of the Cold War, at the beginning of the 1990s, these 
technological developments could find their way to the market and trigger further 
investment. Indeed, the free circulation of the relevant stock of knowledge developed for 
military purposes ensued to the break up of the Berlin Wall can be considered at the origin 
of the boom of the "new economy". The ICT revolution of the beginning of the '90 has 
tremendously benefitted from such a "peace dividend", which has undoubtedly played a 
role in the reversal of the productivity trend in the US (gone back to high rates of growth in 
the second half of the 1990s).    8
 
 
The end of the Cold War meant also that the relevance of new knowledge and new 
technologies was rising for the US economy at a time in which markets were becoming 
increasingly integrated, absent traditional geo-political barriers. The political allies of the 
Cold War period were rapidly becoming economic rivals, in a context in which the most 
important productive assets had the nature of intangibles easily appropriable by firms and 
countries that had not paid the cost of their development. Hence, a private need to restrict 
access to such crucial assets arose exactly at a time when the public and private benefits 
from their unrestricted circulation were becoming most apparent. 
 
 
It is, indeed, in this period, that the most radical change in the institutional environment for 
knowledge production has started taking place, under the evident impulse of the United 
States. In particular, such change has taken the form of the institution of a global and 
harmonized set of (minimum) rules for the protection of intellectual property rights that 
States are free to apply in more stringent terms. These rules have been agreed upon in 1994, 
in the context of the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations, under the name of the TRIPs 
agreement. The true institutional novelty of the system resided in the creation of an 
enforcement system capable of being applied globally.  
 
 
Within this global legal framework, and given the increasing degree of integration of the 
world economy, developed countries' governments have found in their interest to move the 
line drawn in the choice between more upstream knowledge produced and freely 
transmitted by Universities and more downstream knowledge that can be privately owned 
by its discoverers.  While a World Government (or, in a similar way, a State isolated from 
the World Economy) could try to draw the line between the production of “open access 
knowledge” (funded by tax revenue) and the production of “closed access knowledge” (that 
is left to the profit-motive of private firms) so as to maximize the benefits accruing to its 
citizens, in an increasingly integrated economy this choice is necessarily affected by the 
relevant externalities connected to knowledge production.  
 
 
Given the presence of knowledge externalities, each national State realizes that its citizens 
get only a fraction of the benefits of investments in public knowledge while some of them 
(and all through national taxation) can gain the full benefit of the investments in privately 
owned knowledge because the benefits from the latter are not shared with the citizens of the 
other countries.  Thus, in an integrated world economy, characterized by internationally 
enforced IPRs, national states have an incentive to increase the number of “closed access 
science” research projects over which private property rights are defined and to move 
upstream the line that separates them from the “open access science” research projects. 
 
  9
Institutions producing and diffusing public knowledge are increasingly seen as a “waste of 
money” and there is a widespread tendency to decrease their funding.  For the same reason, 
the same institutions (Universities, in the first place!) are also under severe pressure to 
betray their nature of organizations mainly dedicated to the production and diffusion of 




  While, in absence of global funding for research, the over-privatization of knowledge 
could  have directly followed even from the behaviour of benevolent national governments 
acting in the interests of their citizens, the tendency to over-privatize could count on 
additional factors: unfortunately, national states are easy targets for the rent-seeking 
activities of global companies while international organizations are, in turn, easy targets for 
both national states and global companies. A new enclosures movement developed and, in 
this case unfortunately, the new commons which were privatized were not lands but the 
non-rival products of human intellect.    
 
 
Last but not least, to the prevalence of an institutional framework characterized by strong 
and upstream IPRs and a limited role for open science, may have contributed also the 
diffusion of a misleading property rights rhetoric that, on one side, implicitly assumes a 
linear relationship between the degree of "closeness" (i.e., appropriability) of knowledge 
and investment in new knowledge production and, on the other side, assumes that the 
institutions of open science work for free. In other words, all too often the losses due to the 
conflict between closeness and the non-rival nature of knowledge are easily discarded as a 
necessary evil amounting only to a loss in static efficiency, thus ignoring the negative 
implications in terms of ability/incentives to develop new knowledge.  
 
A significant part of the economic literature, along the lines of the Solow growth model, 
has for long assumed that the growth of technological knowledge is exogenous, costs 
nothing and is available to all. While the models of endogenous growth have usefully 
removed some of these assumptions, few contributions have explicitly dealt with the role of 
the institutions of open science, thus leading to downplay their role in the economy. 
 
 
Whatever the precise origin of the marked shift towards knowledge privatization and away 
from open science observed in the past two decades, it is our contention that the balance 
between privatized and publicly available knowledge has gone too far to preserve adequate 
incentives to invest in new knowledge development. Far from being linear, the relationship 
between the degree of closeness and investment is more likely to be described as an 
inverted-U. For low degrees of "closeness", short-term incentives to invest increase because 
of the increased appropriability of the benefits from one's innovation. However, as the 
degree of "closeness" increases, the extent of blockage to the productive utilization of 
knowledge also increases, with the result that investment may be hampered.  
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 IPRs  may constitute an important means to appropriate the benefits from investment in 
new knowledge and a precondition for the market exchange of intangibles but they should 
not be considered as an unambiguously superior policy tool nor as the best instrument apt 
to stimulate investment in any innovation context. The many limits to the working of IPRs 
as incentive and transactional tools have  been amply acknowledged by the economic 
literature (see, for instance, Bessen and Meurer, 2008; Boldrin and Levine, 2008; Jaffe and 
Lerner, 2006; NRC, 2004). They follow, on one side, to the intrinsic transactional problems 
arising from the multiplication of veto powers connected to the fragmentation of property 
rights over knowledge resources - a phenomenon often described as "tragedy of the 
anticommons" (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). On the other side, they follow to the strategic 
use of IPRs that appears to be a feature of many innovation domains (even of those where 
IPRs incentive function is considered to be crucial, such as pharmaceuticals, as recently 
shown by the DG Competition Sector Inquiry on the pharmaceutical sector). Patents and 
other IPRs are amply used to block competitors (Cohen et al., 2000), accumulated in order 
to defend a given technological area from competing innovations through so-called "patent 
fences" or "patent flooding" strategies. 
 
  The present institutional framework makes the accumulation of private property rights 
over intangible knowledge a dominant strategy especially for those who have a relatively 
higher “initial endowment” of privatized intellectual assets and a comparative advantage in 
the production of knowledge easily amenable to intellectual property protection.   
 
 
This produces a particularly unequal allocation of intellectual resources among countries  a 
that is as self-reinforcing as  the firm-level allocation of property rights described in the 
previous section. Indeed, countries enjoying a relatively greater endowment of IPRs face 
reduced obstacles to invest in new knowledge, given that they need to incur lower licensing 
costs to access existing knowledge inputs and that they are exposed to a lower risk that 
their investments be blocked by refusals to license or in any case by costly IPRs 
negotiations. This favours further accumulation of IP-protected intellectual assets, 
deepening inequalities.  
 
 
The globalization of IPRs, and the reduction in the extent of publicly available basic 
knowledge, do not only limit the specialization possibilities of each country but also the 
overall investment opportunities of the whole World economy. In this sense, they have to 
be included among the factors that have contributed to the present global crisis.  
Imbalances in the global accumulation of intellectual capital may have played a role as 
long-term causes of the crisis and may have even deeper consequences in the future than 
the balance-of-payments disequilibria on which most of the attention has been focused in 
the years immediately preceding and immediately following the global crisis. 
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An explanation for the existence of global imbalances may reside, indeed, in the 
vicious/virtuous cycles of investment and accumulation of IPRs just described and in the 
inverted-U relationship between the degree of knowledge "closeness" and innovative 
investment. If exclusion from access to IPRs tends to generate vicious circles of 
underinvestment, as it arguably is the case, then the scant investment performance observed 
in the second half of the 1990s in East Asia, Japan and Europe - countries with a limited 
initial IPRs endowment and a knowledge base characterized predominantly by bottom-up 
knowledge - may be rationalized as a consequence of lack of access to IPRs (though, of 
course, other factors have also played a role). If, on the other hand, an inverted-U 
relationship does exist between knowledge "closeness" and investment, it is possible to 
explain also why investment in the most IP-rich country - the US - has started to decline as 
well in the new millennium, in spite of a secularly low cost of capital. 
 
 
Taken together, these two phenomena may explain the slump in investment experienced, 
first, outside of the US, in particular in Japan, East Asia and Europe, and later in the US. 
This substantial decrease in investment, in turn, explains the existence of global imbalances 
better than the hypothesis of a "saving flood" on which much emphasis has been placed, in 
that it is more consistent with the available data. Data from the IMF (IMF 2005) show, 
indeed, that savings have been rather constant in countries outside of the US, excluding 
China, in the past two decades. Investment  rates, by contrast, have substantially decreased. 
In particular, in the East-Asian area, aggregate investment rates have decreased by 10% in 





The interpretation we propose thus suggests to look at some roots of the present crisis that 
are deeply embedded in the current institutions of the knowledge economy. It follows that, 
in considering the way out of the crisis, the role of policies that may redress the balance 
between public and private knowledge should be considered. It is to these policies that we 
now turn.  
 
 
OVERCOMING THE CRISIS: PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE "SUPER-
MULTIPLIER". 
 
While the present institutions of the global economy are likely to contribute to a prolonged 
stagnation, the knowledge-intensive economy offers great opportunities for more effective 
Keynesian policies. Instead of being used inefficiently to nationalize the assets of firms 
producing private goods, public funds could be used to decrease the monopolization of 
knowledge and to efficiently transfer knowledge from the private to the public sphere. The 
institution of a strong WRO (World Research Organization) should balance the WTO, 
which has increased the relative convenience of intellectual private property to such a great 
extent. A WRO should create the conditions in which  public intellectual property is 
feasible whenever it is able to foster development. All governments should acknowledge  1 2
that knowledge is a non-rival (or even an anti-rival) good which should be treated as the 
most precious and specific global common of humankind.  
 
 
Anti-crisis policies should include the funding of public research infrastructures which help 
to solve the property right paradox we have considered in the second section. It would be 
extremely helpful for this funding to be coordinated at the supranational level in order to 
prevent the free riding problems among countries which are presently fettering investment 
in public research. In the long run, a new economic structure based more on the binomial 
open science/open markets than on the closed science/closed markets one may arise. 
Overcoming stagnation and democratizing the economy are complementary policy 
objectives. In the long run, development requires free access to knowledge and the 
flourishing of many firms whose property structure allows workers to enhance their skills 
without fear of being expropriated of the results of their investment in human capital. 
 
 
The transition to this new property right structure offers great opportunities for Keynesian 
policies. In the current crisis, public funds should not only finance new research projects 
but should also be used to acquire well-established IPRs from private firms. The effects of 
this policy would have immediate effects and would go well beyond those entailed by 
many current anti-crisis measures.  
 
 
First, this form of public funding does not involve nationalization of the firm or the use of 
taxpayers money without any returns on it.  By contrast, while the IPR is paid at its private 
value, it is transferred into the public arena where it has a greater public good value and 
decreases costs for many producers.  
 
 
Secondly, financial support is granted to firms who have proved to be innovative. A 
powerful stimulus for new investments is given to the most efficient firms. On the one 
hand, these firms receive fresh funds but, on the other, having sold the old intellectual 
property rights, they face tough competition. Therefore, they urgently need to invest in the 
production of new intellectual assets, which boosts aggregate demand.  
 
  
Thirdly, a monopoly price for the intellectual asset is replaced by the lower (zero) 
competitive price, which again has a positive effect on aggregate demand.  
 
 
Finally, the “anti-commons” problem is eased; everyone can now invest in new knowledge 
being aware that complementary pre-existing knowledge is less likely to be owned by other 
firms and involve costly future negotiations, which may often fail (Pagano, Rossi 2004). 
Moving IPRs into the public domain makes it unnecessary to undertake future risky 
transactions to benefit from the fruits of innovation. While the immediate funding goes to  1 3
incumbent innovative firms, which may often belong to the richer countries, new 
knowledge becomes freely available to everyone and yields widespread beneficial effects, 
thereby contributing to the overall development of the world economy.  
 
 
 The multiplicative effects just outlined are stronger than those traditionally associated with 
standard Keynesian policies: they are more powerful both on aggregate demand and on the 
level of efficiency of the economy. An investment “super-multiplier” can be made to work 
in knowledge-intensive economies.  It can couple the standard advantages of Keynesian 
spending in time of unemployment with the efficiency effect of moving a non-rival good 
such as knowledge from the private to the public sphere. 
 
 
Owing to the long-standing academic dominance of neo-liberal ideology, in the present 
crisis state intervention is seen as a necessary short-run evil which will necessarily produce 
serious long-run problems. By contrast, redressing the balance between public and private 
knowledge would not only have strong short-run multiplicative effects; it would have long-
run benefits as well. A new democratic economy, based on open markets and open 
sciences, and Keynesian policies of public investments in public research are both 
necessary to overcome the present global crisis. We do not simply need better regulations 
to protect savings.  We do also need those investments and work opportunities that cannot 
blossom in a world of closed science and closed markets.  We must give the present crisis a 
chance to be the first and the last major crisis of the new knowledge economy. 
   1 4
References. 
 
Bessen, J. and M.J. Meurer (2008) Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers 
Put Innovators at Risk, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Boldrin M. and D. K. Levine (2008) Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Braverman, H. (1974) Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Degredation of Work in the 
Twentieth Century, New York: Monthly Review Press. 
David P. (2004) Understanding the emergence of 'open science' institutions: functionalist 
economics in historical context. Industrial and Corporate Change V. 13, N. 4 pp. 571-589 
Earle J, Pagano U. and M. Lesi (2006)  'Information Technology, Organizational Form, and 
Transition to the Market', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60: 471-489. 
IMF, 2005. World Economic Outlook.  
Hart, O.D. (1995) Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Jaffe, A.B. and J. Lerner (2006) Innovation and Its Discontents:￿How Our Broken Patent 
System is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Marglin, S. (1974) 'What Do Bosses Do?', Review of Radical Political Economy, 6: 60-112. 
Marx, K. (1967)  Capital. Vol. I, New York: International Publishers.  
National Research Council (2004) A patent system for the 21st century, Washington: 
National Academies Press. 
Pagano, U. (2007) 'Cultural Globalization, Institutional Diversity and the Unequal 
Accumulation of Intellectual Capital' Cambridge Journal of Economics, 31(5): 649-667. 
Pagano U. and M. A.  Rossi (2004) ' Incomplete Contracts, Intellectual Property and 
Institutional Complementarities', European Journal of Law and Economics, 18(1): 55-76. 
Pagano U. and M. A. Rossi (2009) 'The Crash of the Knowledge Economy', Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 33(4): 665-683. 
Pagano U. and R. Rowthorn (1994) 'Ownership, Technology and Institutional Stability', 
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 5(2): 221-243. 
Rowthorn,  R. (1974) 'Neo-classicism, Neo-Ricardianism and Marxism', New Left Review,  
86: 63-82. 
Samuelson, P. (1957) 'Wage and Interest: A Modern Dissection of Marxian Economic 
Models', American Economic Review, 47: 884-912.  




i On the notion and significance of "open science" see, for instance, David (2004). 
ii This point was first made by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). See also Alchian (1987).  1 5
                                                                                                                                                                         
iii Initially developed by Marx in the first book of Capital, this point has been taken up by 
numerous ‘radical economists’: for instance Braverman (1974), Marglin (1974), Rowthorn 
(1974), Edwards (1979), and Bowles and Gintis (1999).   
iv The integration of the radical and neo-institutional arguments implies the possibility of 
multiple organizational equilibria (Pagano and Rowthorn 1994). The two directions of 
causation are estimated in Earle, Pagano, Lesi (2006) where it is shown that the radical 
direction of causation is stronger than the new institutional one. Pagano (2007) considers 
the relation between the multiplicity of capitalism varieties and globalization with 
particular reference to IPRs and the accumulation of “intellectual capitalism”. 
v These arguments are articulated further in Pagano and Rossi (2009). 